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I. Introduction
Parties obliged to litigate in unfamiliar and foreign surroundings may feel uncertainty
and anxiety. The reduction of differences in procedural systems could be an important
aspect in efforts to achieve more fairness and predictability in international litigation. The
American Law Institute project on Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure endeavors to
draft procedural rules that the countries of the world could adopt for the adjudication of
private international disputes.' First steps are currently being taken for a joint project of
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and the Amer-
ican Law Institute. A working group of nine members appointed by both institutes is pre-
paring a code of principles of international civil litigation. This code of principles could be
a first step toward a UNIDROIT Model Code. Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure for
the world, a single system of procedures for hundreds of different legal communities: is it
only a dream or could it become reality? As a reporter of UNIDROIT for this project and
as a member of the joint working group, the author of this article is no neutral observer.
This article is the report of a committed European proceduralist who is convinced of the
necessity for better worldwide procedural cooperation. This conviction is not only the result
of legal studies in international law, but also of having practiced international litigation for
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Law Institute on Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure. The text of this article is a revised version of this
study and of a paper given at Harvard Law School in September 1999. The author wishes to express his gratitude
to Peter Murray, Robert Braucher Visiting Professor, Harvard, and to Dr. Alexander Bruns, LL.M., and Dr.
Robert Schumacher, LL.M., Freiburg, for their cooperation.
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L.J. 387 (1998); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Preliminary Draft of the ACI Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure:
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nearly twenty years as a judge in state courts with special competence for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. The first part of this article analyzes the present situation
of transnational civil procedural law. The second part describes the purposes and chances
of success of transnational rules. The third part reflects on the position of U.S. civil pro-
cedure from a European point of view.
1. The Present Situation of Transnational Civil Procedural
Law
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
Present transnational civil procedural law endeavors to overcome the territorial limita-
tions of national law by international conventions. The most important conventions for the
practicing international lawyer or judge are the Convention on the Service Abroad of Ju-
dicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague Service Con-
vention)' and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention);3 a Hague Convention on international
jurisdiction and recognition does not exist but is now being discussed again.4 Not without
importance for the special field of family law is the Hague Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations (Hague Recognition
Convention),' which the United States has not ratified yet. For the European States, the
Brussels6 and Lugano7 Conventions provide common rules for international jurisdiction
and recognition; a signed European Service Convention will improve the international
service of process.'
B. THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ITS DIFFICULTIES
The practice of international litigation has to cope with remarkable difficulties in fields
where no international conventions apply; but the same is often true for matters where
there are such conventions.
2. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, done Nov. 15, 1965 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
3. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.IA.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
4. See Arthur T. von Mehren, The Case for a Convention-mixte Approach to Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, RabelsZ 61, 86-92 (1997); Preliminary Draft Convention on Juris-
diction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/
draft36e.html (Oct. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Draft Convention on Jurisdiction].
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations, at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/menu23e.htnl (Oct. 2, 1973) [hereinafter Hague Recognition Conven-
tion].
6. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done
Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
7. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done
Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 OJ. (L319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620.
8. For drafts of Council regulations replacing those conventions within the European Union, see Proposal
for a Council Regulation (EC) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 1999 OJ (C376E/1) and Proposal for a Council Directive on the Service in the
Member States ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1999 OJ (C247E/ 1).
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1. International Jurisdiction and Lis Alibi Pendens
The efficiency of an action is not seldom disturbed by the differences between the rules
on personal and in rem jurisdiction and by a strong diversity of the rules regarding lis alibi
pendens (lack of jurisdiction of the second court, parallel proceedings, antisuit injunctions,
etc.). These discrepancies are a permanent source of conflict between the courts of different
nations and often hinder the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
2. Commencement of Proceedings
The Hague Service Convention is not mandatory and exclusive in the opinion of most
signatory countries; rather, it specifies optional rules governing various possible ways of
service abroad that could be used directly or by letter of request; many states have excluded
certain forms of service provided by the Convention. In the field of service abroad and of
the Hague Service Convention, the unification of law has made but poor progress, as each
country practices its own method of service abroad; moreover, there is a strong tendency
towards fictitious domestic service to avoid service abroad. This practice generates many
issues and difficulties first in the proceedings of the forum and later in recognition proce-
dures. As a consequence, the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Justice, and
national constitutional courts have had to cope with matters of service abroad.9
3. The Taking of Evidence Abroad
The Hague Evidence Convention is not mandatory and exclusive in the opinion of most
signatories as well-the United States and its Supreme Court included.10 The signatory
states seek to conduct the taking of evidence under their respective national rules and to
avoid letters of request to a foreign authority under the Hague Evidence Convention where
possible. The limits to taking evidence abroad under national rules and the problems of
the violation of foreign sovereignty are still in dispute (i.e., depositions, production of
documents or things to experts, and medical examinations in foreign territory). When the
courts avail themselves of the mechanism of the Hague Evidence Convention, the appro-
priate latitude of discovery has become an issue of continuous discussion between the
United States with their broad approach and the rest of the world.
4. The Active Roles of Judges and Lawyers
It is common knowledge that the Anglo-American adversary system lives on the activity
of the parties and their attorneys-automatic discovery at the pre-trial stage, presentation
of evidence at trial, parties' responsibility for legal grounds and legal authorities, and parties'
responsibility for settlements. Continental European proceedings are managed by judges
who have responsibility for fact-finding, law, and settlements. This divergence results from
profound differences between the legal cultures and is rooted in different conceptions of
the citizen-state relationship. Sometimes the adversary system is assigned to democracy and
the continental European judge-dominated system to more authoritarian" or, in modern
times, social or even socialistic societies. In any case, this fundamental difference nurtures
the somewhat prejudiced mutual impression that the proceedings sometimes lack fairness.
9. See Volkswagen AG v. Schlunck, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988); Lancray v. Peters and Sickert [1990] 1 ECR
2725; Punitive Damages, BVerfGE 91, 335, at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/dfr/bv09l335.html (1994).
10. See Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Atrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
11. See D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1977] 2 W.L.R. 201 (Lord Simon).
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There is still another, seldom-discussed difference in the civil procedural practice: be-
tween thirty and fifty percent of the continental proceedings are finished by judgment after
final hearing or trial, whereas only five or six percent of Anglo-American disputes proceed
to trial with a final judgment. 2 The judicial decision is more of a dominant purpose of civil
procedure in the continental European than in the Anglo-American concept of justice and
its administration. The pretrial process provides a good chance to settle a dispute through
the activity of the lawyers, and this case management seems to be better accepted in Anglo-
American than in civil law countries.
5. Professional Judges and Jury
The continental European and the present English civil procedure prefer professional
judges; hearings and trials in U.S. federal civil procedure are ruled upon by professional
judges, but in many cases laymen jurors return a verdict after instructions from a profes-
sional judge. The right to a jury trial," which is an important guaranty of the federal
Constitution and nearly every state constitution, has remarkable consequences for the struc-
ture of civil procedure and the law of evidence; necessarily, both focus on the presentation
of all the material and evidence before laymen jurors. For European continental critics, this
presentation sometimes appears to be more of a drama than a due process of law to find
the truth and to give a fair judgment. The jury trial is the main source of mistrust and
aversion of European defendants in the United States as a forum of international litigation,
even though jury verdicts and especially punitive damage awards are often overruled and
reduced by the courts of appeals as "unreasonable." The poor opinion of the jury trial is
increased by intra-American criticism, and contrasts in a peculiar way with the great esteem
in which U.S. law is held as a mainspring of innovation and legal dynamism.
6. The Structure of the Proceedings
Nearly all national civil procedure laws divide proceedings into two stages.' 4 In Anglo-
American law, the pretrial stage with its discovery is used to gather all the facts and to find
new evidence, to determine the crucial issues for trial, and in most cases, to settle the dispute
by a lawyers' agreement. The German pretrial stage prepares the final hearing and the
taking of evidence at trial without any chance for fishing expeditions. French and Italian
civil procedure is divided into a stage of judicial fact-finding and a stage of legal decision
through the final hearing. The variety of these structures makes the mutual understanding
of foreign procedural law more difficult and produces misunderstandings when evidence is
to be taken abroad.
7. Costs
Most civil procedure laws entitle the prevailing party to reimbursement of all necessary
costs from the losing party; under the "American rule" each party has to bear its own costs
12. See, e.g., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., No. 330 (1994) (3.5 percent of federal district court pro-
cedures in 1993); SETTLEMENT IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 279-87(German Federal Justice Department ed. 1983)
(thirty percent to fifty percent from 1971 to 1981).
13. For further details on the institution of a jury trial, see Edward H. Cooper, Directionsfor Directed Verdicts,
A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv. 903 (1971); James Fleming, Right to jury Trial in CivilActions,
72 YALE LJ. 655 (1963); and Hans Zeisel,... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federaljury,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971).
14. See Rolf Stiirner, The Structure of the German and European Civil Procedure, SYMBOLAE VITOLDO BRON-
IEWicz DEDICATAE 417-34 (1998).
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and expenses. 15 In the United States, the widespread use of contingency fee arrangements
may tend to increase the volume of punitive damage awards. This system encourages law-
yers to initiate new actions; their fishing for clients with good cases is a competition for a
market, whose permanent growth is in the interest of all lawyers and their representatives.
The value of a case depends on the credit a lawyer is willing to give to it. There is nearly
no risk for the claiming party, but the defendant has to pay his attorney without any op-
portunity to recover his expenses. Further burden may be placed upon the shoulders of the
defendant due to the practice of American lawyers to bill by the hour, which often creates
incalculable and immense costs. Continental European lawyers consider this system of cost
allocation unfair because the aggressor bears no real risk and there is no proportionality of
the burdens of cost and interest in litigation. "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant
drawn to the United States"lt-a well-known and often cited statement of Lord Denning.
8. Recognition and Enforcement
The enforcement of judgments in foreign countries is burdensome and time-consuming.
The refusal of recognition and enforcement sometimes is the consequence of fundamental
differences in the substantive law (i.e., punitive or multiple damages,7), which cannot be
eliminated by measures of procedural law, though special emphasis should be given to the
fact that the jury system and the American rule for costs intensify the effect of legal diver-
gence, especially in liability cases. Very often, errors and mistakes during the commence-
ment of proceedings are important reasons for the denial of recognition: exorbitant juris-
diction rules, parallel proceedings with inconsistent judgments, but mostly, inappropriate
service abroad (even within the European Union). The execution itself, which is governed
by the law of the executing country, may be delayed by the exequatur proceedings. Once
the exequatur is granted, the enforcement usually requires no more time than a normal
national execution under the domestic law of the judgment rendering state with its some-
times very different effectiveness. Some national laws do not provide for the execution of
judgments that order a party to perform or to refrain from a given act and instead prefer
damage awards. Many debtors, though bound by well-reasoned judgment, instrumentalize
the creditor's longer way to execution for delaying tactics.
I. The Purposes and the Chances of Success
of Harmonization
A. UNIFICATION OF LAWS OR HARMONIZATION OF LAws?
Many problems with international litigation would be solved if the same rules of civil
procedure were in place all over the world. However, not only would it be unrealistic to
attempt to standardize procedural law worldwide, it may not even be desirable to have only
one uniform law of civil procedure. The competition between different systems of law is
vital to the development of law worldwide. Moreover, the law of civil procedure is too
deeply embedded in the legal culture to permit a worldwide unification. However, a clearly
15. For a discussion of the American and English rules, see NEIL ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
442 (1994);JACK I. H.JACOB, THE FABRIC OF ENGLISHJUSTICE 274 (1987).
16. Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 2 All ER 72, 74 (C.A.).
17. See BGHZ 118, 312 (refusal of recognition and enforcement of a punitive damages award).
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perceptible harmonization (as opposed to standardization) of procedural laws would facili-
tate cross-border litigation substantially; it could save costs and may strengthen the confi-
dence of parties in the enforcement of law worldwide. Furthermore, grounds for a court's
refusal to enforce a foreign judgment would become more and more exceptional; also, it
would be possible to simplify considerably the national procedures for the recognition of
foreign judgments. Cross-border law enforcement would become more effective. Finally,
international conventions would be based more and more on common rules and guidelines.
B. FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES TO THE HARMONIZATION OF PROCEDURAL LAWS
It should be stressed in concurrence with the drafts of the American Law Institute that
all important laws of civil procedure have certain basic categories in common: the right of
access to justice, the principle of public trial, the right to a neutral judge, and the right to
be heard (which implies some basic elements of the adversary system or principe du contra-
dictoire).'s Further common elements concern the right to give evidence and the rules of
finality of judgments. It is often said that there are fundamental differences between the
civil law system and the common law system that hinder a successful harmonization.m9 This
is, however, not the case (which is also the opinion of the American Law Institute's drafts).
For example, the difference in structure between the modern German procedure and the
new English procedure is but relative. Both English and German law provide for prelimi-
nary proceedings, which are conducted mainly in writing and serve the purpose of preparing
the taking of evidence at trial. At the preliminary stage, there is only one "preparatory"
hearing if possible. In regard to the pretrial stage, the differences between the modern
English and German procedures on the one side and the Romanic systems on the other
side are even greater in many respects. The "instruction proceedings" of French, Spanish,
and Italian law with their series of hearing sessions aim at a full inquiry into the facts. They
are hardly separated from the final hearing where questions of law are decided. In German
procedure, the judge traditionally plays quite an active role. The same applies to modern
French civil procedure. In Italian and in ordinary Spanish procedure, on the other hand,
the judge is considerably less active. The English reform of civil procedure as prepared by
the Woolf Report shows that a more active role of the judge is not altogether incompatible
with common law traditions and the traditions of one of the oldest modern democracies of
Europe.20
Much stronger are the differences between U.S. civil procedure and the rest of the world:
broad discovery, no cost-shifting (American rule), and jury trial. While U.S. rules on dis-
covery and costs seem to be open to compromise, the jury system is, for the time being,
mandatory on constitutional grounds. The impact of jury participation on the structure of
a trial should be neither underestimated nor overestimated. Even if there is a jury, the chair
of the trial remains with the judge. If it were possible to strengthen the active role of the
18. See Walther F. Habscheid (ed.), Effectiveness ofJudicial Protection and Constitutional Order, GeneralReports
for the Vlth International Congress on Procedural Law, Congress Volume (1983).
19. See, e.g., ROBERT WYNES$ MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTOICAL PERSPECTIVE
27 (1952). "English Civil Procedure thus became a sealed book to all but Englishmen-a completely insulated
system which did not look beyond itself." Id.
20. See CPR Part 1.4, but see the critical remarks of many authors in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (A.A.S.
Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds. 1995).
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judge during the presentation of the evidence to the jury, the risk of manipulative conduct
by attorneys, which is feared by Europeans as well as by Japanese, South Americans, and
Australians, would diminish. The jury trial would then become more similar to a civil law
trial with influential participation of lay judges, like proceedings in commercial matters
where lay participation is very usual. It would be necessary here to explore in detail the
elasticity of the U.S. constitutional framework. After all, the jury is not an absolutely in-
surmountable obstacle to the harmonization process. Finally, it should be noted that not
all proceedings in U.S. courts are jury proceedings. In those instances, the possibilities of
harmonization are better. In the long run, the effect of harmonization may influence the
reality of jury trials.
C. CONVENTION OR MODEL CODE?
One conceivable way to achieve harmonization would be a convention that provides a
framework to be implemented by the contracting states. However, as far as civil procedural
law is concerned, the experience with the Hague conventions is not very encouraging. The
contracting states tend to fear binding obligations and a loss of creative freedom. Such
conventions are, therefore, quite often too broadly worded, or they are merely an optional
collection of the existing national solutions. This is the shortfall of the Hague Service
Convention and of the Hague Evidence Convention. In the present negotiations to the
conclusion of a Hague Recognition Convention, the preliminary draft refrains from pre-
scribing a limited number of grounds for international jurisdiction. The draft of the special
commission of the Hague Conference provides for a "white list" with fully accepted grounds
for jurisdiction, a "black list" with exorbitant and excluded grounds, and a "grey list" with
grounds for jurisdiction of tolerable national preference."'
A model code or a code of principles of international litigation has the advantage of
definitely leaving each state its creative freedom. It is up to each state to decide whether it
is convinced in full or in part of this code and its rules and whether and to what extent it
is going to adopt those rules. In this respect, the UNCITRAL model code on arbitration
has had very encouraging results. The free decision for the convincing solution of inter-
national legal problems is a better basis for legal progress than a multilateral convention
with its inflexibility.
D. SCOPE OF THE MODEL RULES
1. Conceivable Alternatives
Of course, the complete or only slightly modified adoption of all the model rules through
the national legislators would always best suit the intentions of the draftsmen of a model
code. Different options are conceivable: the legislator may decide that all the rules should
apply to all kinds of civil proceedings, that they should only apply to "international civil
proceedings," or that they should apply to certain types of international proceedings. Ad-
ditionally, the national legislator may also choose to adopt only some of the model rules or
to leave the choice of the model rules to the parties to the litigation.
21. Draft Convention on.Jurisdiction, supra note 4, arts. 3-16 (white list), art. 17 (grey list), and art. 18 (black
list).
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2. Rejection of a Too Narrow Scope of Application
Only rarely will all of the rules be adopted. It is, therefore, sufficient for the model rules
to define their core scope of applicability, for example, civil litigation of international or
transnational character. A further reduction of the scope to contractual claims or contractual
choice of the parties would appear less recommendable, since this would mean a limitation
to the genuine area of international arbitration. Other important fields of litigation such as
tort litigation, antitrust law, intellectual property law, or statutory claims should not be
excluded. Otherwise, in the view of important trading partners of the United States, the
model code might lose attraction.
3. Attraction of Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure-Equality of the Parties
to the Litigation
The limitation of a code of principles or a model code to "transnational proceedings"
would create a special set of procedural rules to accompany domestic procedure. The full
or partial adoption of the rules in respect of transnational and domestic proceedings would
be hard to achieve and could-if at all-only take place very slowly. The idea of special
proceedings for certain types of cases is not new to national procedural laws. The question
remains, however, whether this idea is convincing; in particular, the introduction of special
proceedings for transnational litigation contradicts the rule that the law should be applied
regardless of the nationality of the parties. Why should, for example, a foreign plaintiff in
a European court have wider discovery at his disposal than a European plaintiff. Or, why
should the American plaintiff in the United States be limited in discovery, only because he
is suing a Japanese defendant? Such differentiations can only be justified if the model rules
offer some advantage to the parties. This advantage may and must consist of the fact that
during the proceedings it is easier to get cross-border judicial assistance and that the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments is easier to achieve under the model rules than
under the national rules of procedure.
E. SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF HARMONIZATION
1. International Jurisdiction
The various national rules regarding international jurisdiction and the common rules of
bilateral or multilateral conventions are-at least in the central questions-converging.
The controversial discussion about questions of jurisdiction at the negotiations on a Hague
Recognition Convention are not very encouraging and strengthen the reservations against
providing clear and mandatory rules of international jurisdiction in a code of principles of
international litigation. However, it is not advisable to waive from the start any chance of
reaching a common rule on international jurisdiction and of excluding expansive grounds
for jurisdiction. A code of principles could take into account the results of the Hague
negotiations and the experiences with the Brussels Convention and its reforms.
It would be very important, too, to make provisions for the consequences of lis alibi
pendens. The experiences with the rules of the Brussels Convention-lack of jurisdiction
of the court of the second suit 22-are not very convincing because many slow-working
courts in some European regions are preferred by parties demanding a negative declaratory
22. Brussels Convention, supra note 6, art. 21.
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judgment. The solution to this problem may consist of a compromise between the European
system lack of jurisdiction of the court of the second suit) and the Anglo-American system
(parallel suits). The second proceeding could be stayed with the option of reopening it
again in case the first proceeding does not provide timely and satisfying relief. This seems
now to be the wise compromise of the last draft of a Hague Recognition Convention.3
The regulation of lis alibi pendens would also presuppose an agreement on the question of
when separate actions concern "the same subject matter."
2. Commencement of International Suits
A mere reference to the Hague Service Convention raises many doubts and does not
provide answers to numerous questions of practical importance. For example, it is left to
the lex fori to draw the line between the service of documents abroad and the domestic
service of documents. This will often lead to the nonapplication of the Hague Service
Convention. There is no rule on the consequences of irregularities of proceedings, for
example, lack of translation. The Hague Service Convention knows many forms of service
abroad, some of which are subject to reservation clauses of contracting states.2 4 It does not
mention the American practice of service by waiver" and the problems resulting from it.
It is worth considering whether a code of principles or model rules should not seize the
opportunity to solve some of these problems and to regulate in greater detail how the
conventions should be applied. One important proposal of the American Law Institute on
the commencement of international suits would clearly improve the present situation in
that it demands for the translation of the statement of claim as well as of the summons to
appear.
3. Disclosure and the Taking of Evidence
A worldwide acceptable conception of disclosure and the taking of evidence should at-
tempt to strike a balance between the U.S. concept of pretrial discovery followed by the
taking of evidence at trial on the one hand and the European system on the other.
a. Basically Unrestricted Access to All Evidence
American law in principle grants a party access to all evidence of the other party and of
third persons (written and oral testimony, documents and things, expert testimony, inter-
rogation of parties, etc.). The principle of unrestricted access corresponds to recent Eu-
ropean developments. The restrictions of German law on the right to demand disclosure
of evidence from the adversary or from third persons are rather exceptional. Another com-
mon feature of American, modern French, and English procedure is the tendency to provide
for an "automatic" disclosure principally without court order as to documents and other
forms of information and for a court order where the disclosure involves more substantial
interference, such as medical examinations.
b. Scope of Disclosure and of the Taking of Evidence-Relevancy
American law seeks to limit the scope of preliminary discovery by introducing the concept
of "relevancy to the subject matter involved in the pending action." It provides for prelim-
23. See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 4, art. 21.
24. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8-10.
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) and (0.
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inary disclosure of certain categories of documents, and for the disclosure of potential
witnesses and other forms of information. The court has the authority to limit or bar
disclosure that is too far-reaching and abusive.16 These rules, however, do not prevent
fishing expeditions, which are a matter of concern in Europe and elsewhere. Evidence is
considered to be relevant when it tends to achieve rationally reliable knowledge of a fact
in issue. 7
In European civil procedure and-with some restrictions-even in the reformed new
English procedure, the strict relevancy of disclosure and evidence to the action is controlled
by the court from the very commencement of the suit.2" The parties are obliged or more
obliged to identify specifically and individually the objects of discovery or evidence.
A meaningful compromise may consist of a two-step-system. In the first step, discovery
or evidence may only be demanded or taken as to facts that are "strictly relevant to the
action;" the object of disclosure or evidence must be specifically identified by the party. In
the second step, the court may order, where justified, that further disclosure should take
place (reversion of the rule-exception-relationship of U.S. law). From the standpoint of the
European legal systems and of other similar legal systems, it is sufficient that a party may
demand disclosure only of specifically identified evidence; the U.S. model, however, may
have great advantages in exceptional cases where the European civil procedures break off
the process of ascertaining the truth too early. In this regard, there is a pressing need for
further discussion. The present, still very broad, American concept of disclosure and even
evidence hardly stands a good chance of success elsewhere in the world.
c. Examination of Witnesses and Parties-Expert Witnesses
The equation of witness examination and party examination is one of the most remarkable
developments of the English and American law of evidence in the nineteenth century. It
will probably be accepted by continental European systems, since the special rules for party
statements (i.e., subsidiarity, party oath as irrebuttable presumption, etc.) are somewhat in
retreat and are not representative of modern tendencies. Austrian and German civil pro-
cedure follows nearly the same rules for witness and party examination and they abandoned
the irrebuttable presumption of the party oath many decades ago.
The Anglo-American model of witness or party examination is the cross-examination of
the jury trial; this is also true for trials without a jury and for depositions. The principles
of cross-examination survived the recent reform of English civil procedure. Each party
presents its own witness, and so does the court if-more extraordinarily-a court witness
is called to give testimony. This procedure is expressive of the idea that the parties prepare
their witnesses and that it is up to the parties to comport with certain evidentiary rules
during the examination. The continental European approach clearly differs somewhat from
the Anglo-American model: the witness in German civil proceedings, for example, is to tell
his story first coherently, unaffected by the parties and the court; but then the court and the
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); JAcK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 1993).
27. See FED. R. EvID. 401; FRIDENTHAL, supra note 26, § 10.2.
28. For information on Germany, see LEO ROSENBERG ETAL., ZIVILPROZEORECHT,§ 113 13 (15th ed. 1993).
For information on France, see HENRY SOLUS & ROGER PERROT, DROIT JUDICIAIRE PRIV9, Tome 3, No. 734
(1991) (fait pertinent). For information on Italy, see ENRICO TULLIO LIEBMANN, MANUALE DI DI1rro PROCES-
SUALE CIVILE, PRINCMr No. 152 (5th ed. 1992) (giudizio di relevanza). For information on Spain, see MONTERO
AROCA ET AL., DERECHO JURISDICCIONAL 184 (1995). For information on England, see CPR Parts 31.6 (limited
standard disclosure), 31.12 (specific disclosure), and 32.1(1)(a) (control of evidence by the court).
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parties may pose questions. This model is likely to correspond better to the results of the
psychological analysis of the examination process. The harshness of cross-examination is,
inter alia, due to the preparation of the witnesses, which the other systems often do not
consider serviceable to the revelation of the truth. A compromise could combine continental
and Anglo-American advantages: the full and coherent story of the witness under the court's
instruction in the first stage, and cross-examination by the parties in the second phase.
The European development prefers the independent expert of the court; the new English
procedure focuses on the expert's duty to help the court, overriding any obligation even to
persons and parties from whom an expert witness is instructed or paid. English courts may
direct that evidence be given by a single, joint expert only.29 The elevated position of court-
appointed experts in modern American civil procedure ° is progress towards common con-
ceptions.
d. Privileges
In the United States, the privilege most widely accepted and most significant is the
attorney-client privilege, complemented by the work-product rule and the privilege of
communication in settlement negotiations. The husband-wife privilege and privileges of
other relatives as well as other professional privileges are disputed in the United States and
subject to diverging state law (qualified privileges, privileges as absolute rights of substantive
law, etc.)."' In Europe, except for England, privileges for all important professionals are
recognized, and for relatives and spouses as well; like in the United States, the business and
trade-secrets privileges are still in dispute, but normally better protected than in Anglo-
American civil procedure with its pretrial protective orders and its tendency towards full
and unlimited evidence at trial. The main reason for this remarkable divergence is the
equation of witness and party examination in Anglo-American civil procedure: the scope of
disclosure would be too narrow if parties could claim the various continental third-person
privileges. A bad compromise-partially realized by the Hague Evidence Convention-is
the applicability of the privileges of the lex fori. The continental idea of an absolute pro-
tection of privacy and business secrets by privileges for third persons reflects the common
procedural tradition before the nineteenth century's equation of witness and party testi-
mony; its extremely rigid performance might have been a wrong development because of
the lack of any differentiation between the duties of self-interested parties and third persons
giving evidence for someone else's dispute.
e. Taking Evidence Abroad
It is, as mentioned at the beginning, an open question, whether and when the taking of
evidence abroad should be admissible (investigations of experts, depositions, etc.) without
leave of the foreign courts. For example, in the United States, civil procedure depositions
are not taken in court; rather, only the attorneys are present. Therefore, American civil
procedure law is prone to consider the taking of depositions or expert evidence abroad
appropriate without assistance of foreign courts, unless immediate compulsion is necessary;
in contrast, indirect compulsion, like a good faith control of a party who is the employer
29. See CPR Parts 35.3, 35.4, and 35.7.
30. See FED. R. EVID. 706; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 730-32 (2000).
31. For more information, see Federal Rules of Evidence 501 with the advisory committee's note and the
reports of the parliamentary committees. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 900-1070 (2000).
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of a witness, is permissible. In such cases, the European practice demands a letter of request
under the Hague Evidence Convention and the assistance of the foreign court. A code of
principles of international litigation would be a propitious occasion to resolve this perma-
nent conflict and to provide for a common rule of practice, taking the request under the
Hague Evidence Convention as remedy of the first resort.
f. Rules of Evidence and Consideration of Evidence
American, not modern English, law knows manifold evidentiary rules that in part are
explicable by the presentation of the evidence before a jury (i.e., the hearsay rule, restriction
of character evidence to impeachment of witnesses, evidentiary rules against opinions of
witnesses, etc.)." Those evidentiary rules are not intelligible to an ordinarily qualified Eu-
ropean lawyer because he cannot exactly know their systemic origin. The traditional law of
evidence has more and more disappeared in the present English civil procedure as the rule
against hearsay is now being abandoned in the most recent English Evidence Acts." The
modern continental and English civil procedure is governed by the general principle of the
free consideration of proof. Whether additional exclusionary rules of evidence must con-
tinue to exist in American law is a difficult question, the answer to which depends on
whether the function of the jury can be confined in favor of an increased influence of the
judge controlling the taking of evidence and especially the cross-examination.
4. The Role of the Court and the Parties
a. Inquisitorial and Managerial Judge
European civil procedure is never really inquisitorial; neither is the German civil pro-
cedure nor the modern French civil procedure. Nearly worldwide, civil procedure relies on
party activity, but allows for additional court activity. The coordination of party activity
requires case management by the court. This case management, which is not an inquisitorial
fact finding but invites the parties to coordinate their activities, is mandatory in many
continental codes of civil procedure and now in the reformed English procedure, too.3 4
The difference between modern European civil procedure and U.S. civil procedure con-
cerns not only the extent of court management, but also the important question of whether
court management should be merely optional or really mandatory.
b. The Burden of Legal Findings
In this context, one should discuss if and to what extent the burden of legal findings rests
entirely with the court as it is common practice on the European continent (da mihifacta
dabo tibi ins) or whether the parties need to present the legal grounds. Case management
by the court without a clear legal basis is hardly conceivable, and from my point of view
one of the open questions of the English reform. The English reform fully breaks the Anglo-
American tradition of the judicial umpire and demands for the managing judge; but in
Anglo-American tradition, it requires that the parties state the legal grounds of their claim
and their defenses respectively and remains silent as to the authority or duty of the judge
to discuss issues of law and to make independent legal findings.
32. For a very short survey, see FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 26, at 466-72.
33. Civil Evidence Acts 1968 and 1995; see Civil Procedure, Volume 2, The White Book (2000) run. 9B-
229 and 9B-268.
34. See, e.g., art. 8, 10 N.C.P.C. (France); §§ 139, 278 ZPO (Germany); and CPR Parts 1.4 (c), 3.3, and
32.1 (England).
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c. Court Managed Party Activity as a Compromise
A code of principles of international litigation must take into account the worldwide
tendency toward court-managed party activity; it should avoid the extreme positions of the
judge as a mere umpire and of the inquisitorial judge. The judge's authority to initiate or
further settlements reflects the present state of common legal developments, not always of
a common reality.
d. Court Management and Jury System
A harmonization of systems with professional judges and the American jury system might
be achieved by means of more judge-dominated case management as well. One should think
about whether further harmonization would be possible if special verdicts or general ver-
dicts with interrogatories were made obligatory. A general verdict lacks any reasoning; jury
instructions and their effect often remain unclear. A special verdict or a general verdict with
interrogatories would make the decision-making process more transparent and strengthen
the position of the professional judge. Even a procedural structure with its separation be-
tween pretrial and trial will find the acceptance of the procedural laws in the European
tradition if an active role of the judge is ensured sufficiently even at the pretrial stage.
5. Costs
A compromise between the American cost rule and the law of the rest of the world is
nearly impossible. It is interesting that the model code draft of the American Law Institute
recommends discarding the American rule. However, the reasonable extent of litigation
costs-hourly billing, specified lump sum attorney's fees depending on the amount in
dispute-needs further clarification and the new English cost rules could be a sensible
compromise. The Anglo-American payment into court is a very attractive instrument to
further settlements and to avoid the waste of time and unnecessary costs.
IV. The Position of the United States from a European
Point of View
It would be a strong mistake to consider the cooperation between different procedural
cultures and the chances of an adaptation of national procedural law to be merely a question
of legislative technique and of craftsmanship. Rather, the procedural structure is deeply
rooted in the fundamental values of the respective legal and political cultures. In my opin-
ion, there are four important aspects of American legal and political culture that should be
taken into account when procedural cooperation between the United States, Europe, far
eastern countries, and the rest of the world is discussed: the long and never seriously dis-
turbed American tradition of democracy and its connection with the adversary system and
jury trial; the American conviction of a genuine Anglo-American way to truth and justice
by jury trial; the powerful position of the American lawyers; and a fundamental American
aversion to relinquish a part of national sovereignty in the interest of a better international
administration of justice.
A. ADVERSARY SYsTEM, JURY TRIAL, AND DEMOCRACY
Sometimes, the American procedure with its adversary system, settlement-favoring pre-
trial stage, and jury trial is attributed to democratic constitution; the continental procedure
with its judicial activity and dominating professional judges is attributed to bureaucracy,
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hierarchy, and even totalitarianism." Because of their political catastrophes within the twen-
tieth century, Germany and Japan especially take this kind of classification very hard, for
example, when the German roots of the Japanese procedural law are connected with total-
itarianism and the U.S. influence on this law after 1945 is connected with the introduction
of democracy in Japan.
On the other hand, it would be wrong to indulge in false touchiness. It is true that the
American procedural model is based on the idea of subsidiarity of state interference: only
when the pretrial discovery of the parties does not lead to any results, in a small number
of cases a judgment will follow, which is often not given by professional judges but by
elected citizens as members of the jury. The structure of the American procedure is by all
means an expression of the citizen's responsibility for the administration of justice. The
structure of the continental procedure shows a public, authoritative, and more hierarchical
responsibility for the administration of justice. In American legal thinking, the law is a
means of solving conflicts within society, a matter of practical experience, and common
sense, therefore more a permanent task, which concerns the whole of society.36 In the earlier
continental legal thinking, law has been more a matter of ideas, concepts, and scholarliness;
it has been set down in codifications and distributed as a ready-made product by the courts
among the citizens. It may be the case that the capacity of American legal culture to cope
with political pressure and seduction is stronger because this culture keeps its citizens awake.
Those, for example, who seriously argue in Germany that the courts could have blocked
the road to totalitarianism sixty-five years ago fail to realize that the law is already half lost
if it is left exclusively to the courts. Rights are only prospects and possibilities that come to
nothing when nobody struggles for them; so states the fundamental thesis of James Gold-
schmidt," a German-Jewish proceduralist holding the chair of civil procedural law in Berlin,
before his emigration because of the Third Reich. It may be true that the American pro-
cedure keeps this basic truth more alive than the continental systems.
This assignment of the American procedural structure to democratic self-government is,
however, only half of the truth. This is because the determination of the law through the
parties and laymen juries has its own inherent risks. The adversarial procedure is very time
consuming and expensive and, in case of great intellectual or economic differences, it cannot
be realized. Moreover, it requires the willingness of the lawyers to cooperate. Fully deciding
laymen juries without proved intellectual standard or legal knowledge are a big risk, espe-
cially for defendants. Only the balancing activity of the professional judge can compensate
for these deficits. The modern English tendency towards a more active professional judge
is less caused by a growth of bureaucracy and least of all by tendencies toward totalitari-
35. See, e.g., D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1977] 2 W.L.R. 201 (Lord
Simon); ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 40; Marcus, Malaise of the Litigation Superpower, in CIVILJUSTICE IN CRISIS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 71, 101 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999) (the subheading
"Judges Ober Alles: The Rise of Managerial Judging" is an innuendo concerning the former first verse of the
German national anthem; its text had been permanently abused in a very misleading way by the Nazis in the
Third Reich). This argument is critically discussed in John H. Langbein, The Influence of the German Emigris
on American Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in DER EINFLUp DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN
AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 320, 328-31 (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993);
Takeshi Goto, Dissertation, The Respective Roles of the Parties and the Judge in Civil Litigation: English andJapanese
Laws (1992).
36. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
37. JAMES GOLDSCHMIDT, DER PROZEO ALS RECHTSLAGE 1 (1925).
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anism; it is the well-prepared development of a strong and well-working democracy towards
a better compromise between the adversary system and judicial management.
B. THE JURY TRIAL AND ITS EVIDENTIARY RULES-A GENUINE AMERICAN WAY TO TRUTH
AND JUSTICE?
The jury trial and its evidentiary rules seem to be an important part of a special American
procedural identity supported by the conviction of an existing genuine American way to
truth and justice." Common efforts at the harmonization of procedural law are based on
the conviction of a broad, common procedural tradition-including American civil pro-
cedure. The influence of the Roman-canonic civil procedure on continental civil procedure
was undoubtedly great. But the same is true for Anglo-American civil procedure. Its most
important part is not the jury trial or trial with its partially Germanic roots. When the
normal American citizen brings his case to the courts as claimant or defendant he will nearly
never come to the trial judge or jury, because more than nine out of ten cases are disposed
of at the pretrial stage. The normal procedural reality is not the trial stage but the pretrial
stage. The American pretrial stage is the historical successor of equity proceedings and,
therefore, similar to the continental procedure of Roman-canonical procedure. 9 Even the
evidentiary rules of the trial stage are no real innovation of the Anglo-American legal culture
as a consequence of the jury trial. It is true that this is a well-accepted opinion established
by Thayer and Wigmore as important authorities. The most recent works of English and
American authors on procedural history show that many evidentiary rules of the trial are
of Roman-canonical and continental origin, for example, the rule against hearsay as rejec-
tion of testimony ab alio auditu or the parol evidence rule as a very old rule of the Codex
Justinianum.4 Many European procedural cultures know laymen judges, especially in com-
mercial matters. The idea of a citizen judge is no special Anglo-American tradition. In
Europe, the Laymen judges of the French Revolution could not cope with the evidentiary
rules of the Roman-canonic procedure, the free consideration of proof, and the free ad-
missibility of evidence have been the important consequences. 4' Even though the modern
English civil procedure is governed by the general principles of free admissibility of evi-
dence and consideration of proof, the traditional law of evidence has more and more dis-
appeared. The protection of lay judges by evidentiary rules in the United States-perhaps
it is a solution without future. The carefully appointed and elected lay judges of the French
commercial courts need not be protected by evidentiary rules-in my opinion the better
way of lay participation in the administration of justice.
38. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 1-6 (1898);J.
WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW, e.g. §§ 4, 8, 575, 2250, 2256, 2426, and 3426 (3rd ed.
1940). For England, see RUPERT CROSS, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 1 (7th ed. 1990) and G. D. NOKES, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO EVIDENCE 18 (4th ed. 1967).
39. See MILLAR, supra note 19, at 23; R. C. van Caenegem, History of European Civil Procedure, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 45, 74, 103, and 105 (Mauro Capalletti ed., 1972).
40. For details and references, see MICHAEL R. T. MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQUITY
(1999).
41. For further details, see MASSIMo NOBILI, IL PRINCIPIO DEL LRERO CONVINCIMENTO DEL GIUDICE 147
(1974).
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C. THE POWERFUL POSITION OF AMERICAN LAWYERS
For American lawyers worldwide, international litigation is a new and perhaps growing
market especially if the procedural role and position of the lawyers will be the same as in
national proceedings. The more active role of the judge and more strict judicial relevancy
control diminish the chance for extensive pretrial discovery proceedings with big bills by
the hour. American attorneys and their organizations are, therefore, sometimes no friends
of procedural reforms seeking to compromise with the continental system. Nevertheless,
the victory of the better and more convincing concept-which would consist of a
compromise-over economic interests is a question of time, and the English development 2
is very encouraging. Ten years ago, nobody would have thought of an English procedural
move towards continental procedural models-now it is reality.
D. THE AMERICAN AVERSION TO RELINQUISH SOVEREIGNTY
The American aversion to relinquish a part of national sovereignty in the interest of
better worldwide cooperation in transnational litigation and a better worldwide adminis-
tration of justice seems to be fundamental; this is the understandable consequence of the
experience that the due process of law has been an unchallenged essential of American
democracy for more than two centuries and that most countries of the world are without
strong and long-standing traditions in the due administration of justice. But the world is
sometimes afraid of the long arms of the American courts-a feeling that is growing in the
new era of a nearly uncontested pax americana. The United States never ratified a conven-
tion with an obligation to change or adapt their procedural law. All the Hague Conventions
were interpreted by the United States and the Supreme Court as an additional option for
international litigation, not as an obligation to obey mandatory contractual procedures. In
the eyes of many foreign observers, the multi-armed Brahman of the American jurisdiction
has always got an arm more. There are some indications giving reason to hope for better
compromises in the present Hague negotiations on a recognition convention. "The strong
man is the mightiest alone" 4 and nobody concludes a binding contract or convention with-
out any need. But the rest of the contracting world is not out only for harmonization, but
for its own advantage as well. Harmonization without mutual sacrifice and adaption has no
future and perhaps the time of splendid procedural isolation has already passed. For Eu-
ropean countries, harmonization of procedural law is more and more the reality of a Eu-
ropean Union, even for England. It is encouraging that the American Law Institute has
made important first steps to remarkable compromises with continental European and con-
tinentally influenced procedural forms. And it was a big minority of four U.S. Supreme
Court judges who voted for a more mandatory understanding of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention with the clear intention to create a model of transatlantic civil proceedings. 44 Let
us go on to cultivate a common transatlantic and transpacific legal culture.
42. Critically discussed from an American point of view by Richard L. Marcus, "Dia Vu All Over Again"?
An American Reaction to the WoolfReport, in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 20, at 219.
43. FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, WILHELM TELL, Act 1, Scene 3.
44. See SociitiNationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor dissenting).
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